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 Th is article covers developments at the international criminal tribunals that 
occurred in the year 2008. 1 It provides a brief summary of the decisions and 
developments deemed most relevant by the authors. 
 1. Elements of Crimes 
 1.1. Th e Objective and Subjective Elements of the War Crime of Pillaging 
 In the decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges in the  Katanga and  Ngudjolo Chui 
case Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC elaborated on the deﬁ nition and the requi-
site elements of ‘the war crime of pillaging under Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the ICC 
Statute, 2 which is criminalized under the Rome Statute whether it is committed 
in international or internal armed conﬂ ict. According to the Elements of Crimes, 
the war crime of pillaging requires proof of the following three elements: ‘(i) the 
perpetrator appropriated certain property; (ii) the perpe trator intended to deprive 
the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or personal use; and 
(iii) the appropriation was without the consent of the owner’. 
 *)  Th e views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reﬂ ect the views of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or the United Nations. 
 1 ) For developments January – November 2007,  see M.E. Badar/N. Karsten , Current Developments 
at the International Criminal Tribunals, 8  International Criminal Law Review 2008, 353-380. 
 2)  Several provisions under Article 8 of the ICC Statute address war crimes involving the 
destruction, appropriation, seizure and pillage of property, see for example Article 8(a)(iv), 8(2)(b)
(xiii), 8(2)(e)(xii), 8(2)(b)(xvi) and 8(2)(e)(v) ICC Statute. Th ese provisions ﬂ ow from diﬀ erent 
international instruments, and protect slightly diﬀ erent interests, but in practice they overlap 
considerably. 
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 Th e Pre-Trial Chamber held that the property must belong to an “enemy” or 
“hostile” party to the conﬂ ict. Th erefore, the pillaged property – whether move-
able or immoveable, private or public – must belong to “individuals or entities 
who are aligned with or whose allegiance is to a party to the conﬂ ict who is 
adverse or hostile to the perpetrator”. 3 According to the Pre-Trial Chamber the 
crime encompasses both  dolus directus of the ﬁ rst degree and of the second degree. 
Th e Chamber further found that the war crime of pillaging is a “speciﬁ c intent” 
crime which requires proof of  dolus specialis on the part of the perpetrator with 
regard to two elements: ‘First, the act of physical appropriation must be carried 
out with the intent to deprive the owner of his property. Second, the act of physi-
cal appropriation must also be carried out with the intent to utilise the appropri-
ated property for private or personal use’. 4 
 1.2.  Persons Hors de Combat  Can Be Victims of Both Crimes Against Humanity 
and War Crimes  
 Can persons  hors de combat be victims of a crime against humanity? Despite the 
extensive case-law of the Tribunals in relation to crimes against humanity, this 
question had remained unsettled until October 2008 when the Appeals Chamber 
in the  Martić case rendered its judgement. 
 In the trial judgement of 12 June 2007 the  Martić Trial Chamber had relied on 
rulings of the Appeals Chamber in the  Galić and  Blaškić cases when dealing with the 
issue. It held that persons  hors de combat , while being protected in armed conﬂ icts 
through Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, are not “civilians” in the 
context of international humanitarian law. 5 Since persons  hors de combat are still 
members of the armed forces of a party to the conﬂ ict, they fall under the category 
of persons referred to in Article 4(A)(1) of the Th ird Geneva Convention and, as 
such, are not civilians in the context of Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I. 6 
In contrast, the Appeals Chamber in the  Kordić and  Čerkez case appeared to have 
expanded the term “civilian” to cover persons  hors de combat . 7 
 Th e Appeals Chamber in the  Martić case now settled the issue. In fact, it 
distinguished two issues. First it held that Article 50 of Additional Protocol I does 
 3 )  Katanga &  Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges, para. 329. 
 4 )  Katanga &  Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges, para. 332. 
 5 )  Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgement, 29 July 2004, paras 113-114; 
 Prosecutor v. Galić , Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeal Judgement, 30 November 2006, fn. 437, quoted 
by  Martić Trial Judgement, para. 55. 
 6 ) Article 50 (1) of Additional Protocol I reads: 1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to 
one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4(A)(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Th ird 
Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. 
 7 )  Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez , Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeal Judgement, 17 December 2004, 
paras 421-422. 
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not only deﬁ ne the notion “civilian” for the purposes of Common Article 3 
crimes, but also for the purposes of crimes against humanity, namely for the  cha-
peau requirement “civilian population”. Th e Appeals Chamber reasoned that the 
fundamental character of the notion “civilian” both in international humanitar-
ian law and international criminal law militates against giving it diﬀ ering 
meanings. 8 
 However, the question whether only “civilians” may be victims of crimes 
against humanity is a second issue which must be discussed separately. While the 
 chapeau requirement of crimes against humanity is that the acts of the accused 
form part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a  civilian 
 population, this requirement does not necessarily imply, in the Appeals Chamber’s 
view, that the criminal acts within the attack must be committed against civilians 
only. 
In that regard, it is worth noting that the presence of combatants within a civil-
ian population does not necessarily deprive the population of its civilian charac-
ter. 9 It is conceivable that criminal acts are committed against persons  hors de 
combat who are present within the civilian population. 
 Th e Appeals Chamber found that the drafters of the Statute did not intend to 
exclude persons  hors de combat from the purview of crimes against humanity. 10 
It consequently held that persons  hors de combat could be victims of crimes against 
humanity and found that this approach has already been implicitly followed by 
the Tribunal in a number of cases. 11 
 1.3. War Crime of Collective Punishment (the Notion of “Punishment”) 
 Th e Appeals Chamber of the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL), by majority, 
held that the Trial Chamber erred in law in its deﬁ nition of the crime of collective 
punishments, and overturned  Fofana’s and  Kondewa’s convictions for that crime. 
Th e Appeals Chamber emphasised that the notion “punishment” is an 
 ‘indiscriminate punishment imposed collectively on persons for omissions or acts 
for which some or none of them may or may not have been responsible’. 12 As 
such, “punishment” is distinct from the targeting of protected persons as 
  8)  Prosecutor v. Martić , Case No. IT-95-11-A, Appeal Judgement, 8 October 2008, paras 299, 
302. 
  9) See i.e.  Prosecutor v. Blaskic , Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgement, 29 July 2004, para. 107, 
see also  Prosecutor v .  Martić , Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgement, 12 June 2007, para. 50. 
 10 )  Prosecutor v. Martić , Case No. IT-95-11-A, Appeal Judgement, 8 October 2008, paras 305, 
306. 
 11 )  Prosecutor v. Martić , Case No. IT-95-11-A, Appeal Judgement, 8 October 2008, paras 308, 311, 
313, 314. 
 12 )  Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa , Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeal Judgment, 28 March 2008, 
paras 223-224. 
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objects of attack. Th e targeting of protected persons as objects of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity may not necessarily be predicated upon a perceived 
transgression by such persons and therefore does not constitute collective 
punishment. 13 
 Th us, the  mens rea element of collective punishments represents the critical 
diﬀ erence between the war crime of collective punishment and the act of target-
ing. While targeting takes place on account of who the victims are, or are per-
ceived to be, the crime of collective punishments occurs in response to the acts or 
omissions of protected persons, whether real or perceived. 14 
 1.4. Other Inhumane Acts / Forced Marriage 
 Th e SCSL Appeals Chamber in the  Brima et al. case reversed the ﬁ nding of the 
Trial Chamber that had interpreted forced marriage as a crime of sexual nature, 
covered and completely subsumed in the crime of sexual slavery in Article 2(g) 
of the SCSL Statute. Th e Trial Chamber also found that Article 2(i) of the SCSL 
Statute, other inhumane acts, must be restrictively interpreted to exclude crimes 
of a sexual nature. 15 
 Th e Appeals Chamber held that, while forced marriage shares certain elements 
with sexual slavery such as non-consensual sex and deprivation of liberty, forced 
marriage is not adequately characterised as the crime against humanity of sexual 
slavery. Forced marriage involves a perpetrator compelling a person through his 
words or conduct, or those of someone for whose actions he is responsible, into a 
forced conjugal association with another person. Unlike sexual slavery, forced 
marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between the “husband” and “wife”, 
which could lead to disciplinary consequences for breach of this exclusive arrange-
ment. 16 Th ese distinctions imply, in the Appeals Chamber’s view, that forced 
marriage is not predominantly a sexual crime, but is properly characterised as 
inhumane acts. 17 It also held that acts of forced marriage were of similar gravity 
to several enumerated crimes against humanity. 
 Astonishingly, the Appeals Chamber declined to enter new convictions on that 
ground. Th e Appeals Chamber stated that ‘it is convinced that society’s  disapproval 
 13)   Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa , Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeal Judgment, 28 March 2008, 
paras 223, 224. 
 14)   Ibid . 
 15 )  Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima ,  Brima Bazzy Kamara ,  Santigie Borbor Kanu , Case No. SCSL-04-
16-T, Trial Judgment, 20 June 2007, para. 697. 
 16 )  Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima ,  Brima Bazzy Kamara ,  Santigie Borbor Kanu , Case No. SCSL-04-
16-A, Appeal Judgement, 22 February 2008, paras 195, 196. 
 17)   Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima ,  Brima Bazzy Kamara ,  Santigie Borbor Kanu , Case No. SCSL-04-
16-A, Appeal Judgement, 22 February 2008, paras 199-201. 
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of the forceful abduction and use of women and girls as forced conjugal partners 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population, is 
adequately reﬂ ected by recognising that such conduct is criminal and that it con-
stitutes an “Other Inhumane Act” capable of incurring individual criminal 
responsibility in international law”. 18 
 1.5. Other Inhumane Acts Is Not a “Catch All Provision” 
 In the case of  Katanga and  Ngudjolo Chui the Prosecution charged both suspects 
(now accused) with the commission of crimes against humanity, namely, 
 inhumane acts of intentionally inﬂ icting serious injuries upon civilian pursuant 
to Article 7(1)(k) of the ICC Statute. PTC I noted that ‘the [ICC] Statute has 
given to ‘other inhumane acts’ a diﬀ erent scope than its antecedents like the 
Nuremberg Charter and the ICTR and ICTY Statutes. Th e latter conceived 
“other inhumane acts” as a “catch all provision”, leaving a broad margin for the 
jurisprudence to determine its limits. In contrast, the Rome Statute contains 
 certain limitations, as regards to the action constituting inhumane acts and the 
consequence required as a result of that action’. 19 PTC I noted that the ICC 
Statute deﬁ nes the conduct under Article 7(1)(k) as “ other ” inhumane acts, 
which according to the PTC I indicates that none of the acts constituting crimes 
against humanity under Article 7(1)(a) to (j) can be simultaneously considered as 
an other inhumane act encompassed by Article 7(1)(k) of the Statute. Th us, 
 murder as a crime against humanity, even if in its attempted form, cannot 
be charged simultaneously under Article 7(1)(k) of the ICC Statute as  other 
 inhumane acts. 20 
 Based on the evidence tendered by the Prosecution, the majority of PTC I 
found that the attack on Bogoro was conducted in indiscriminately way using 
machetes, ﬁ rearms and heavy weapons against civilians and that the attackers 
had the speciﬁ c intent to kill such civilians rather than the intent to cause severe 
injuries. 21 Th e majority of the Chamber were of the opinion that ‘the clear intent 
to kill persons cannot be transformed into intent to severely injure persons by 
means of inhumane acts solely on the basis that the result of the conduct was 
 diﬀ erent from that which was intended and pursued by the perpetrators’. 22 
 18 )  Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima ,  Brima Bazzy Kamara ,  Santigie Borbor Kanu , Case No. SCSL-04-
16-A, Appeal Judgement, 22 February 2008, para. 202. 
 19)   Katanga &  Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges, para. 450. 
 20 )  Katanga &  Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges, para. 461. 
 21 )  Katanga &  Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges, para. 458. 
 22 )  Katanga &  Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges, para. 463. 
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 2. Individual Criminal Responsibility 
 2.1. Stretching the Coundaries of Commission Liability 23  
 Th e ICTR Appeals Chamber, by majority, quashed the Trial Chamber’s ﬁ nding 
that  Seromba , a Catholic priest at Nyange Parish, aided and abetted genocide and 
held that he instead  committed genocide as well as extermination as a crime against 
humanity, by virtue of his role in the destruction of the church in Nyange Parish. 24 
Pursuant to these ﬁ ndings, the Appeals Chamber quashed the sentence of ﬁ fteen 
years’ imprisonment and entered a sentence of life imprisonment. 
 Th e Appeals Chamber recalled that “committing” is not limited to physical or 
direct perpetration and that other acts can constitute direct perpetration in the 
 actus reus of the crime of genocide. 25 It found that the Trial Chamber applied the 
wrong legal standard when it held that committing required direct and physical 
perpetration. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, the accused is a principal perpetra-
tor of genocide if his actions were ‘as much an integral part of the genocide as 
were the killings which [they] enabled’. 26 When applying this legal standard to 
the factual ﬁ ndings of the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber came to the 
 conclusion that  Seromba ‘approved and embraced as his own’ the decision to 
destroy the church in order to kill Tutsi refugees and was not an aidor and abettor 
but became a principal perpetrator. 27 It held that it was irrelevant that  Seromba 
did not personally drive the bulldozer that destroyed the church. What was 
important was that  Seromba ‘fully exercised his inﬂ uence over the bulldozer 
driver’ who accepted  Seromba as the only authority and whose directions he fol-
lowed. 28 As for the  mens rea , the Appeals Chamber found that Seromba intended 
that the Tutsi be killed and also acted with the requisite speciﬁ c intent to destroy 
in whole or in part the Tutsi group. 29 Th us, the  Seromba Appeals Chamber 
 23 ) For a critical analysis regarding the ICTR Appeals Chamber’s approach to commission liability 
in recent case law  see F. Z. Giustiniani, ‘Stretching the Boundaries of Commission Liability’, 
6  Journal of International Criminal Justice (2008) 783-799. 
 24 )  Prosecutor v. Seromba , Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Appeal Judgement, 12 March 2008, paras 
171, 172, 185, 190. Judge  Liu dissenting. 
   Th e Appeals Chamber aﬃ  rmed the Trial Chamber’s ﬁ nding that Seromba aided and abetted 
genocide in relation to the killings of Patrice and Meriam, which were separate acts from the killings 
resulting from the destruction of the church. 
 25)   Prosecutor v. Seromba , Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Appeal Judgement, 12 March 2008, para. 161. 
 26 )  Prosecutor v. Seromba , Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Appeal Judgement, 12 March 2008, para. 
161. See similar wording in  Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi , ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgement, 7 July 
2006, para. 60. 
 27 )  Prosecutor v. Seromba , Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Appeal Judgement, 12 March 2008, paras 
171, 172, 182. 
 28 )  Prosecutor v. Seromba , Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Appeal Judgement, 12 March 2008, para. 171. 
 29)   Prosecutor v. Seromba , Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Appeal Judgement, 12 March 2008, paras 
174-181. For a diﬀ erent assessment of the facts of the case, see Dissenting opinion of Judge  Liu . 
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 widened the scope of “committing”, a mode of liability that was so far mainly 
reserved for “hands-on perpetrators”. 30 Th e ﬁ nding that “committing” must con-
stitute  principal perpetration is a valuable clariﬁ cation of the scope of that mode 
of liability that goes beyond the context of genocide. Persons, who did not directly 
or physically take part in the commission of crimes but whose actions appear as 
an “integral part” of the commission of the crimes or who assume a “central 
role” 31 in the events, are adequately described as principal perpetrators. 
 Further, this broader understanding of “committing” has the eﬀ ect that the 
 mens rea becomes the distinctive criterion. While an aidor and abettor acts with 
the knowledge that his actions will assist the principal perpetrator in the commis-
sion of the crime, a principal perpetrator himself must have the intent to commit 
the crime or in the Appeals Chamber’s words must “approve and embrace” the 
crime “as his own”. 
 2.2. Joint Criminal Enterprise  Objective Need Not Be Criminal as Long as the 
Means Contemplated to Achieve It Are Crimes Within the SCSL Statute 
 Th e SCSL Appeals Chamber in the  Brima et al. case reversed the ﬁ nding of 
the Trial Chamber that the Prosecution had not properly pleaded joint crimi-
nal enterprise. 32 Th e Trial Chamber had found, in particular, that a common 
purpose to ‘gain and exercise political power and control over the territory of 
Sierra Leone’ was not an international crime or a criminal purpose recogn-
ised by the Statute. 33 Th e SCSL Appeals Chamber held that the criminal pur-
pose underlying the joint criminal enterprise need not derive from its ultimate 
objective, but may also derive from the means contemplated to achieve that 
 objective. 34 Although the objective of gaining and exercising political power 
and control over the territory of Sierra Leone may not be a crime under the 
Statute, in the Appeals Chamber’s view, the actions contemplated as a means to 
achieve that objective were crimes within the Statute. Nevertheless, the Appeals 
 30)  It should also be noted that the participation in a joint criminal enterprise is implicit in Article 
7(1) ( Prosecutor v. Tadić , Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgement, 17 July 1999, paras 188-191). 
In the absence of alleged participation in a joint criminal enterprise, an accused, who did not physi-
cally or directly took part in the commission of the crimes, could be found to have “encouraged”, 
“assisted” or instigated the commission of the crime. 
 31 )  Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi , Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgement, 7 July 2006, 
para. 206. 
 32)  See  M. Badar/N. Karsten , Current Developments in International Criminal Tribunals, 8 ICLR 
2008, 353-380. 
 33 )  Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima ,  Brima Bazzy Kamara ,  Santigie Borbor Kanu , Case No. SCSL-04-
16-T, Trial Judgment, 20 June 2007, para. 67. 
 34 )  Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima ,  Brima Bazzy Kamara ,  Santigie Borbor Kanu , Case No. SCSL-04-
16-A, Appeal Judgement, 22 February 2008, paras 76, 80. 
234 M.E. Badar and N. Karsten / International Criminal Law Review 9 (2009) 227–251
Chamber did not see any need to make further factual ﬁ ndings or to remit 
the case to the Trial Chamber for that purpose, having regard to the interests 
of justice. 35 
 It is worth pointing out that the ﬁ nding of the Appeals Chamber that joint 
criminal enterprise is a means of committing a crime and not a crime in itself is 
in line with the jurisprudence of other international tribunals. 36 
 2.3. Control Over the Crime Approach: Th e Katanga Decision  
 In  Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui the PTC I analysed principal responsibility under 
Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute (see Chart no. 1 below). Based on the  Lubanga 
Decision, 37 the PTC I found that ‘when a criminal oﬀ ence is committed by a 
plurality of persons, the deﬁ nitional criterion of the concept “joint commission” 
is linked to the distinguishing criterion between principals and accessories to a 
crime’.  38  
 35 )  Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima ,  Brima Bazzy Kamara ,  Santigie Borbor Kanu , Case No. SCSL-04-
16-A, Appeal Judgement, 22 February 2008, paras 84, 87. 
 36 ) See e.g.  Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al. , Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeal Judgement, 28 February 
2005, para. 91 referred to in  Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima ,  Brima Bazzy Kamara ,  Santigie Borbor 
Kanu , Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Appeal Judgement, 22 February 2008, paras 77, 78. 
 37 )  Prosecutor v. Th omas Lubanga Dyilo , Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the conﬁ rmation 
of charges, 29 January 2007 (Lubanga decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges). 
 38 )  Katanga &  Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges, para. 480. 
Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute 
physically carries out all elements of the offence
(commission of the crime as individual) 
has, together with others, control over the offence
by reason of the essential tasks assigned to him
(commission of the crime jointly with others)
has control over the will of those who carry out the
objective elements of the offence
(commission of the crime through another person)
Chart no. 1
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 2.4. Commission Th rough Another Person – Perpetrator Behind the Perpetrator by 
Means of Control Over an Organisation 
 In deﬁ ning the elements for the commission of the crime through another person 
the  Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui PTC I based its ﬁ ndings mainly on German law 
and literature ( mittelbare Täterschaft ). 39  Mittelbare Täterschaft or perpetration by 
means, also known as ‘indirect perpetration’ or ‘indirect perpetratorship’, is char-
acterized by the predominance of the  perpetrator-by-means ( Hintermann ), who 
uses the person that physically carries out the crime ( Tatmittler ) as his instru-
ment. 40 Th e perpetrator by means “controls the situation because he has superior 
knowledge or superior powers in relation to the agent”. 41 However, ‘indirect per-
petratorship’ is not limited to situations where the physical perpetrator is an 
innocent agent, or has a defence such as insanity or infancy. In such cases, an 
innocent agent is a “mere machine whose movements are regulated by the princi-
pal”. 42 Rather, the notion of indirect perpetration also applies even where the 
direct and physical perpetrator is criminally responsible (‘indirect’ perpetrator 
behind the ‘direct’ perpetrator or  Täter hinter dem Täter ). 43 According to the 
 Katanga PTC this latter scenario,  Täter hinter dem Täter , is the most relevant to 
international criminal law “in which the perpetrator behind the perpetrator 
 39 )  Katanga &  Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges, paras 495-518. Th e sec-
ond clause of § 25(1) of the  dStGB (German Criminal Code) is concerned with the principal 
by means ( mittelbarer Täter ) a person who acts through the agency of another ( Tatmittler ). 
See Michael Bohlander,  Principles of German Criminal Law , (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 
at 156. 
 40 ) Albin Eser, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in Antonio Cassese et al., (eds.)  Th e Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2002) 793-95. 
 41)  Michael Bohlander,  Principles of German Criminal Law , (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 156. 
See also para. 497 of the  Katanga &  Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges: “Th e 
underlying rationale of this model of criminal responsibility is that the perpetrator behind the 
perpetrator [ Täter hinter dem Täter ] is responsible because he controls the will of the direct 
perpetrator”. 
 42 ) Glanville Williams,  Criminal Law: Th e General Part , 2nd edn., (London: Stevens & Sons, 1961) 
349-350. As noted by Professor Michael Bohlander –  Principles of German Criminal Law (2009) at 
156 – German jurisprudence and commentators have acknowledged ﬁ ve categories according to 
which a person can be considered as an instrument:
  a)  Th e agent is not fulﬁ lling either the  actus reus or  mens rea of the oﬀ ence. 
 b)  Th e agent lacks a speciﬁ c  mens rea component or has a  mens rea for a diﬀ erent oﬀ ence. 
 c)  Th e agent is acting objectively lawfully ( rechtmäßig ) under an accepted defence. 
 d)  Th e agent is acting without personal guilt ( schuldos ) under an accepted defence. 
 e)  Th e agent lacks criminal capacity. 
 43)  Kai Ambos, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in Otto Triﬀ terer (ed.),  Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court :  Observers’ Notes ,  Article by Article , (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999) 478, margin 9. 
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 commits the crime through another by means of ‘control over an organisation’ 
( Organisationsherrschaft )”. 44 
 Th e PTC I found that the commission of the crime through another 
person – the third variant of principal liability under Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC 
Statute – encompasses the perpetrator behind the perpetrator by means of con-
trol over an organisation. 45 
 In the Chamber’s view, it was the intention of the drafters of the ICC Statute 
that Article 25(3)(a) encompasses commission “through a non-innocent indi-
vidual” acting as an instrument, and also perpetration by means of control over 
an organisation. 46 According to the Chamber, the framework of the Statute, by 
speciﬁ cally “regulating the commission of a crime through another responsible 
person,” targets the category of cases which involves a perpetrator’s control over 
the organisation”. 47 Moreover, national jurisdictions such as Germany have relied 
on the concept of perpetration through control over an organisation in order to 
hold the leaders or highest authorities within an organisation responsible as a 
principal perpetrator. 48 Further, the Pre-Trial Chamber takes the  Stakić Trial 
Judgement as proof of the application of the doctrine, although the judgement 
was overturned on appeal on the ground that the doctrine did not form part of 
customary international law. In the Pre-Trial Chamber’s view, the question 
whether the “perpetrator behind the perpetrator” and “perpetration through con-
trol over an organisation” doctrine was part of international customary law was 
“not relevant” for the ICC since the ICC Statute, forming the ﬁ rst source of 
applicable law for the ICC according to Article 21, expressly provided for that 
speciﬁ c mode of liability. 49 Finally, the Pre-Trial Chamber referred to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in the  Bemba Gomba case which endorsed the mode of liability. 50 
 Th e Pre-Trial Chamber went on deﬁ ning the requirements of perpetration by 
means of control over an organisation. It held that the organisation must be based 
on hierarchical relations between superiors and subordinates and that the organi-
sation must consist of suﬃ  cient subordinates to guarantee that superior’s orders 
will inevitably be carried out, if not by one subordinate, then by another. 51 
In addition, the Chamber held that the main characteristic of this kind of 
 organisation is a mechanism that enables its highest authorities to ensure 
 44 ) Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges, para. 498. 
 45)  Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges, paras. 500-518. 
 46 ) Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the conﬁ r-
mation of the charges, 30 September 2008, para. 499. 
 47 ) Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges, para. 501. 
 48 ) Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the conﬁ r-
mation of the charges, 30 September 2008, paras 500-505. 
 49 ) Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the conﬁ r-
mation of the charges, 30 September 2008, para. 508. 
 50 ) Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the conﬁ r-
mation of the charges, 30 September 2008, para. 509. 
 51 ) Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges, para. 512. 
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 automatic  compliance with their orders. 52 In the words of Professor Roxin: “Such 
Organisation develops namely a life that is independent of the changing compo-
sition of its members. It functions, without depending on the individual identity 
of the executant, as if it were automatic”. 53 Th e leader’s ability to secure this auto-
matic compliance with his orders is the basis for his liability as a principal. 
According to the Chamber “[t]he highest authority does not merely order the 
commission of a crime, but through his control over the organisation, essentially 
decides whether and how the crime would be committed”. 54 
 Th e Chamber also held that automatic compliance with the orders may also 
be achieved “through intensive, strict, and violent training regimens”, thus open-
ing the mode of liability to include perpetrators like  Katanga and  Ngudjolo 
Chui who are charged with the crime of using children under the age of ﬁ fteen 
to take actively participate in the hostilities and who have allegedly secured 
compliance with their orders through the abduction of minors who were sub-
jected to punishing training regimens in which they were taught to commit 
crimes. 55 
 As regards the mental elements, the Chamber held that the persons must be 
aware of the factual circumstances enabling them to exercise control over the 
crime through another person, such as the character of the organisation, their 
authority within the organisation, and the factual circumstances enabling near-
automatic compliance with their orders. 56 Th e mode of liability “commission of 
a crime through another person by means of control over an organisation” has the 
potential to became most relevant to international criminal law, in particular 
since the PTC held that it can also be committed “jointly”. 57  It appears that it 
may even substitute the JCE liability which is extensively used by the adhoc 
Tribunals but in relation to which the ICC has already raised reservations. 58 
 2.5. Superior Responsibility 
 In 2008 the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY issued three important judgements, 
in which it further reﬁ ned the requirements for superior responsibility, namely, in 
 Orić ,  Hadžihasanović &Kubura , and  Strugar  cases. 
 52 ) Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges, para. 517. 
 53)  C. Roxin, Taterschaft und Tatherrschaft, 8th edn., (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006) 245, quoted in 
Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges, para. 517. 
 54)  Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui decision on the conﬁ rmation of charges, para. 518. 
 55)  Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the conﬁ r-
mation of the charges, 30 September 2008, para. 518. 
 56)  Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the conﬁ r-
mation of the charges, 30 September 2008, paras 534, 538. 
 57)  Id., paras. 491-494. 
 58)  Prosecutor v. Th omas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the conﬁ rmation 
of charges, 29 January 2007, paras. 334 et seq. 
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 2.5.1. Identiﬁ cation of Subordinates 
 Th e Appeals Chamber in the  Orić case held that, while it is not necessary to iden-
tify the subordinates in person, at least “their existence” must be established 
before superior responsibility can arise. 59 Th e Appeals Chamber reversed the con-
viction of  Naser Orić for crimes committed by the Military Police because the 
Trial Chamber did not mention the potentially culpable members of the Military 
Police but only established the existence of the Military Police as an entity. 60 
 Th e identiﬁ cation of the subordinates and ﬁ nding of their criminal responsi-
bility is particularly important in cases where subordinates of the accused are 
alleged to be criminally responsible for the crimes of direct perpetrators who are 
not subordinates of the accused. 61 
 2.5.2. Eﬀ ective Control - No Reversal of the Burden of Proof in Case of a De Jure 
Superior 
 In the seminal  Čelibići case, the Appeals Chamber held that in general, the pos-
session of  de jure power in itself may not suﬃ  ce for the ﬁ nding of command 
responsibility if it does not manifest in eﬀ ective control, although a court may 
presume that possession of such power  prima facie results in eﬀ ective control 
unless proof to the contrary is produced”. 62 Th e Appeals Chamber in the 
 Hadžihasanović & Kubura case conﬁ rmed the ﬁ nding in the  Čelebići case, but 
clariﬁ ed that there is no legal presumption and no reversal of the burden of 
proof. 63 Th e Appeals Chamber in the  Orić case also stated that  de jure authority is 
not synonymous with eﬀ ective control. While the possession of  de jure authority 
may suggest a material ability to prevent or punish, it may be neither necessary 
nor suﬃ  cient to prove such ability.  De jure authority only provides “some evi-
dence” of eﬀ ective control. 64 
 It is noteworthy that the Appeals Chamber in the  Hadžihasanović and Kubura 
case even declined to address whether one of the accused had  de jure authority 
 59)  Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Appeal Judgement, 3 July 2008, para. 35. 
 60)  Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Appeal Judgement, 3 July 2008, para. 35. Th e Trial 
Chamber had only identiﬁ ed one member of the Military Police as a subordinate of Orić, but failed 
to establish on what basis this person was criminally responsible for the crimes committed by the 
principal perpetrators, see paras 36-49. 
 61)  As conﬁ rmed by the Appeals Chamber, superior responsibility is not only imposed when the 
subordinates physically committed crimes, but also for either the omissions of subordinates or 
crimes perpetrated by subordinates by means of modes of liability other than ‘committing, see 
Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT- IT-02-60-A, Appeal Judgement, 9 May 2007, paras 
280, 281; Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeal Judgement, 28 November 
2007, para. 485-486. 
 62)  Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgement, 20 February 2001, para. 
197. 
 63)  Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Appeal Judgement, 22 April 
2008, para. 21. 
 64)  Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Appeal Judgement, paras 91, 92. 
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arguing that “ de jure authority is only one factor that helps to establish eﬀ ective 
control, and because the present question is resolvable on the basis of eﬀ ective 
control alone”. 65 
 2.5.3. Eﬀ ective Control or Cooperation? Military Beneﬁ ts Achieved through 
Independent Units not a Factor to Consider 
 Both in the  Hadžihasanović & Kubura case and in the  Delić case, it was in dispute 
whether the accused exercised eﬀ ective control over Mujahedin detachments, 
which fought alongside with the units of the accused, and whether the accused were 
responsible for crimes committed by these detachments. Th e issue was whether 
the accused bear responsibility since they beneﬁ ted militarily from the coopera-
tion with those units. 
 Th e Appeals Chamber clariﬁ ed that the alleged beneﬁ t from the cooperation 
with other units is not a relevant factor when assessing whether the superior had 
eﬀ ective control. 66 It added that it may entail “some form of responsibility” if “the 
particulars of such responsibility are adequately pleaded in an Indictment”. 
However, ultimately the superior responsibility is only triggered upon a showing 
of eﬀ ective control. 67 
 In the  Hadžihasanović & Kubura case, the Appeals Chamber found that the 
relationship between the accused and the Mujahedin detachment was one of 
cooperation and did not evolve into a superior-subordinate-relationship. 68 In the 
 Delić case, the majority found that the Mujahedin detachment was not an inde-
pendent unit merely cooperating with the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
although it enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. 69 Th e majority found that  Delić 
exercised eﬀ ective control over the Mujahedin and was, therefore, criminally 
responsible for a number of crimes committed by the Mujahedin. In his dissent-
ing opinion, Judge Moloto considered that the relationship between the Mujahedin 
detachment and the Army of Bosnia was throughout one of cooperation rather 
than one of eﬀ ective control. 70 
 2.5.4. “Had Reason to Know” Due to a Failure to Punish Past Crimes 
 If superiors do not punish past crimes, subordinates may understand that failure 
as acceptance or even encouragement and might continue committing crimes. 
 65)  Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Appeal Judgement, 22 April 
2008, para. 189. 
 66)  Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Appeal Judgement, 22 April 
2008, paras 213, 214, 217. 
 67)  Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Appeal Judgement, 22 April 
2008, para. 213. 
 68)  Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Appeal Judgement, 22 April 
2008, paras 200, 210, 214, 217, 221. 
 69)  Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-T, Trial Judgement, para. 466. Judge Moloto dissenting. 
 70)  Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-T, Dissenting opinion of Judge Moloto. 
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However, as the Appeals Chamber held in  Krnojelac , the failure to punish a past 
crime cannot be taken as proof of knowledge that similar crimes would be com-
mitted in the future. It may be taken as “alarming information” to justify further 
inquiry. 71 
 Th e Appeals Chamber in the  Hadžihasanović & Kubura case further clariﬁ ed 
that this does not mean that the superior’s failure to punish past crimes  automati-
cally constitutes suﬃ  ciently alarming information to meet the threshold of “had 
reason to know”. It held that the assessment has to take into account the circum-
stances of the case. 72 
 2.5.5. Superior Responsibility for Crimes Committed Before Superior Had Eﬀ ective 
Control 
 Superiors may not be held responsible for crimes committed before they assumed 
command and exercised eﬀ ective control. Th is was the debatable ﬁ nding of the 
Appeals Chamber in a jurisdiction decision in the  Hadžihasanović & Kubura case 
of July 2003 that was reached by majority. 73 In the  Orić appeal, the issue came 
back to the Appeals Chamber. Th e Prosecution argued that the Trial Chamber 
erred in law when it found that  Orić could not be held responsible for crimes, of 
which he had knowledge, because they were perpetrated before he assumed eﬀ ec-
tive control over the Military Police. 74 
 Th e majority of the Appeals Chamber in the  Orić case declined to address the 
issue arguing that the  ratio decidendi in the  Hadžihasanović case could not have 
an impact on the outcome of the case. 75 Judge Schomburg and Judge Liu dissented 
holding that the Appeals Chamber should have discussed the validity of the  ratio 
decidendi as a matter of general signiﬁ cance. Judge Shahabuddeen did not for-
mally dissent, but attached a declaration. 76 
 In substance, all three judges agreed that the ﬁ nding of the Appeals Chamber 
in the  Hadžihasanović case was wrong, thus forming a “silent” reversing major-
ity. Judge Liu and Judge Schomburg demonstrated that the restriction in the 
 71)  Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-07-25-A, Appeal Judgement, 17 September 2003, para. 169. 
 72)  Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Appeal Judgement, 22 April 
2008, paras. 30-31. 
 73)  Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on interlocutory 
appeal challenging jurisdiction in relation to command responsibility, 16 July 2003, para. 51. 
 74)  Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Prosecution appeal brief, para. 102. 
 75)  Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Appeal Judgement, 22 April 2008, para. 167. 
 76)  Judge Shahabuddeen was one of the Judges who had dissented in the Hadžihasanović jurisdiction 
decision. With Judge Schomburg and Judge Liu dissenting in the Orić appeal, his vote was decisive. 
In his declaration, Judge Shahabuddeen puts the question whether a judge who dissented in one 
decision can subsequently properly form part of a reversing majority and comes to the conclusion 
that, in the circumstances of the case, “a reversal should await such time when a more solid major-
ity”. Declaration, paras. 13-15. 
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 Hadžihasanović decision does not reﬂ ect customary international law and 
defeats the object and purpose behind the concept of superior responsibility 
which is to ensure compliance with the laws and customs of war and interna-
tional  humanitarian law in general. 77 Th e Appeals Chamber in the  Hadžihasanović 
case was wrong to point to missing state practice and/or  opino iuris . It is 
not an  objection to the application of the principle to a particular situation to 
say that the situation is new if it reasonably falls within the application of 
the principle. In fact, the framework indicating the customary rule already 
existed. 78 
 3. Rights of the Accused 
 3.1. Right of the Accused to Receive Material in a Language He or She Understands 
 An accused has the right to use his mother tongue in written and oral communi-
cations with the organs of the Tribunal and to receive relevant material in a lan-
guage the accused understands. Th is is laid down in the Statute of the Tribunals 
which reproduce Article 14(3)(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. However, the accused may not demand the production of docu-
ments in any language or script that he or she chooses. Th is was held by the 
Appeals Chamber in a decision in the  Tolimir case. 79 
 In the  Karadžić case, the Trial Chamber was seised of a similar request by 
 Karadžić to be provided with all materials, including transcripts of the sessions in 
his case, as well as other transcripts which might be necessary for him to prepare 
his defence, in the Serbian language and in the Cyrillic script. Th e Trial Chamber 
stated that an accused it not entitled to receive all documents in a language he 
understands, but only certain documents, such as the indictment and the mate-
rial supporting the indictment, witness material and all orders and decisions ren-
dered by the Trial Chamber. 80 
 77)  Partially dissenting opinion and declaration of Judge Liu, paras 29-31; Separate and partially 
dissenting opinion of Judge Schomburg, para. 7. 
 78)  Separate and partially dissenting opinion of Judge Schomburg, para.14.; Partially dissenting 
opinion and declaration of judge Liu, para. 33; Judge Shahabuddeen highlighted that the Appeals 
Chamber in the Hadžihasanović decision reached that general ﬁ nding unanimously. Declaration, 
para. 17. 
 79)  Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-PT, T. 114; Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-
88/2-AR73.1, Decision on Interlocutory appeal against oral decision of the Pre-trial judge of 11 
December 2007, 28 March 2008, paras 14, 15. 
 80)  So-called Rule 66(A) material, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5-PT, Decision on the 
accused’s request that all materials, including transcripts, be disclosed to him in Serbian and Cyrillic 
script, 25 September 2008, paras 2, 7. 
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 3.2. Right to Self-Representation – Assignment of Counsel in the Interests of Justice 
 It is worth noting that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY have 
been amended and now include a new Rule 45  ter relating to the right to self-
representation. 81 Rule 45  ter reads: “Th e Trial Chamber may, if it decides that it 
is in the interests of justice, instruct the Registrar to assign a counsel to represent 
the interests of the accused”.    
 Th e adoption of Rule 45  ter eventually brings the rules of the ICTY in 
 conformance with rules and practise of other international tribunals such as the 
ICTR, the ICC and the SCSL 82 and incorporates existing case-law of the ICTY 
into a common rule. Th e ICTY has acknowledged limitations of the right to self-
representation in a number of cases. 83 
 3.3. Fitness to Stand Trial – Fitness to Represent Oneself 
 Th e accused’s ﬁ tness to stand trial is of great importance. Th e Appeals Chamber 
in the  Strugar case held that the ﬁ tness to stand trial may generally be regarded as 
an issue that would signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ect the fair and expeditious conduct of the 
proceedings or the outcome of the trial. 84 Th e applicable standard for assessing 
the ﬁ tness of the accused is that of “meaningful participation” which allows the 
accused to “exercise his fair trial rights to such a degree that he is able to partici-
pate eﬀ ectively in his trial, and has an understanding of the essentials of the pro-
ceedings”. 85 Th e Appeals Chamber emphasised that the ﬁ tness to stand trial must 
be distinguished from the ﬁ tness to represent oneself. Th us, the accused need not 
have the capacity to fully comprehend the course of the proceedings in the trial, 
so as to make a proper defence, and to comprehend details of the evidence. 86 
 81)  Rule 45(A) of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence only allows for the assignment of 
counsel in the interests of justice when the accused is indigent. 
 82)  Rule 45 quater of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence; Art. 67(1)(d) of the Rome Statute; 
ICC Regulation 76(1); Prosecutor v. Norman et al., SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on the application of 
Samuel Hinga Norman for self-representation under Art. 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special 
Court, 8 June 2004, paras 26, 27. 
 83)  Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, 1 November 2004, para. 13; 
Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR 73.3, Decision on Appeal against the Trial Chamber’s 
Decision on Assignment of Counsel, 20 October 2006, para. 20; Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. 
IT-00-39-T, Reasons for Oral Decision Denying Mr. Krajišnik’s Request to Proceed Unrepresented 
by Counsel, 18 August 2005, paras. 5 et seq.; see also Prossecutor v. Stanisic, Case No. IT-04-79, 
Status Conference of 6 May 2008, T. 122 123; Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Decision on Assignment of 
Defence Counsel, 15 February 2006; Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Status Conference of 14 September 
2007, T. 54-55. 
 84)  Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Appeal Judgement, 17 July 2008, para. 34. 
 85)  Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Appeal Judgement, 17 July 2008, paras 55, 60. 
 86)  Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Appeal Judgement, 17 July 2008, para. 60. 
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 Th e Appeals Chamber did not further dwell on the question what eﬀ ect that 
distinction may have in relation to a self-represented accused who is ﬁ t enough to 
stand trial but not ﬁ t enough to represent himself. It can, however, be taken from 
the decision of the Appeals Chamber in the  Milošević case that it would be appro-
priate to limit self-representation of an accused who is unﬁ t to represent himself 
and impose counsel provided that the curtailment of the right to self-representa-
tion is limited to the minimum extent possible. 87 
 4. Primacy/Complementarity of International Tribunals and National 
Courts 
 4.1. Referral Under Rule 11 bis 
 Under Rule 11  bis of the respective Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the ICTY 
and ICTR may refer cases to the authorities of a state for trial. A Referral Bench 
considers the gravity of the crimes and the level of responsibility of the accused. 
It needs to be satisﬁ ed that the accused will receive a fair trial and that the death 
penalty will no be imposed or carried out. 
 4.1.1. No Referral to Rwanda 
 In three remarkable decisions, the ICTR Appeals Chamber upheld the decisions 
of the “Referral Bench” denying referral of two cases to the Republic of Rwanda 
arguing that the Rwandan penalty structure does not meet internationally recog-
nised standards and that there are concerns whether the Accused would receive a 
fair trial. 88 
 On 8 October 2008, the ICTR Appeals Chamber in the  Munyakazi case 
upheld the decision to deny the referral of the case to Rwanda. It held that the 
trial judges erred in ﬁ nding that Rwanda does not respect the independence of 
the judiciary and that the composition of the courts in Rwanda does not accord 
with the right to be tried by an independent tribunal and the right to a fair trial. 89 
However, the Appeals Chamber endorsed the ﬁ ndings as far as the right of the 
accused to obtain the attendance of, and to examine, Defence witnesses under the 
 87)  Th e Appeal Judgement in the Strugar case refers to a decisions in the Milošević case in that 
regard, Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on interlocutory appeal of the Trial 
Chamber’s decision on the assignment of Defense Counsel, 1 November 2004, para. 14. 
 88)  A third decision denying the referral to Rwanda was issued by the Referral Bench in the 
Nizeyimana case. Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on 
Prosecutor’s request for the referral of the case of Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda, 19 June 
2008. 
 89)  Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s appeal 
against decision on referral under Rule 11 bis, 8 October 2008, paras 26-28. 
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same conditions as witnesses called by the Prosecution, is concerned. It was not 
satisﬁ ed that the rights can be guaranteed at this time in Rwanda. It also was not 
satisﬁ ed whether the penalty structure in Rwanda is adequate for the purposes of 
transfer under Rule 11  bis of the Rules. 90 
 Th e ICTR Appeals Chamber also upheld the decision in the  Kanyarukiga case 
denying referral to Rwanda. It stated that “there is genuine ambiguity about 
which punishment provision would apply to transfer cases, and therefore the pos-
sibility exists that Rwandan courts might hold that a penalty of life imprisonment 
in isolation would apply to such cases”. 91 Th e Appeals Chamber also found that 
“ Kanyarukiga might face diﬃ  culties in obtaining witnesses residing within 
Rwanda because they would be afraid to testify, and that he would not be able to 
call witnesses residing outside Rwanda, to the extent and in a manner that would 
ensure a fair trial”. 92 On 5 December 2008, the Appeals Chamber upheld the 
decision in the Hategekimana case to deny referral to Rwanda. 93 
 Th e decisions of the Appeal Chamber caused repercussions. Arrested earlier 
this year in Germany at the request of the Rwandan authorities,  Onesphore 
Rwabukombe and  Callixte Mbarushimana were set free by the German authorities 
because the Rule 11  bis decisions of the Appeals Chamber made it impossible to 
extradite the two persons or to hold them any longer in custody. 
 5. Procedure and Evidence 
 5.1. Retrial of a Case Ordered for the First Time 
 For the ﬁ rst time in the history of international criminal tribunals, retrial of a case 
was ordered. Th e Appeals Chamber in the  Muvunyi case quashed  Muvunyi’s 
conviction for direct and public incitement to commit genocide based on a 
speech he gave at the Gikore Trade Center in Rwanda and ordered a retrial 
limited to the allegations considered in relation to this incident. Th e Appeals 
Chamber criticized the Trial Chamber for not having given a reasoned opinion 
for its ﬁ ndings, thus making it impossible for the Appeals Chamber to determine 
 90)  Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s appeal 
against decision on referral under Rule 11 bis, 8 October 2008, paras 20, 45, 50. 
 91)  Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s 
appeal against decision on referral under Rule 11 bis, 30 October 2008, para. 16. 
 92)  Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s 
appeal against decision on referral under Rule 11 bis, 30 October 2008, para. 26. 
 93)  Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s 
appeal against decision on referral under Rule 11 bis, 4 December 2008. Th e Appeals Chamber, 
however, held that command resposibility is recognized under Rwandan law and that the Trial 
Chamber therefore erred in that aspect, see para. 12. 
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whether the Trial Chamber assessed the entire evidence on this point exhaustively 
and properly. 94 
 Notably, the Appeals Chamber also ordered, in the event that a new Trial 
Chamber was to enter a conviction for the respective charge, that any sentence 
should not exceed the sentence imposed by the ﬁ rst Trial Chamber ( reformatio in 
peius consideration). 95 
 5.2. Stay of Proceedings Ordered in the Lubanga Case 
 On 13 June 2008 the ICC Trial Chamber in the  Lubanga Dyilo case decided to 
stay the proceedings, and on 2 July 2008 ordered the unconditional release of 
 Lubanga Dyilo . 96 Th e Trial Chamber found that the Prosecution breached its 
 disclosure obligation towards the Defence and the Chamber with regard to over 
200 documents of potentially exculpatory material and that it entered into inap-
propriate agreements with information-providers, including the UN. As the dis-
closure of exculpatory evidence in the possession of the Prosecution is a 
fundamental aspect of the accused’s right to a fair trial, the Trial Chamber found 
a stay of the proceedings was inevitable. 97 
 In its decision 21 October 2008 the ICC Appeals Chamber conﬁ rmed the 
decision of the Trial Chamber on the stay of proceedings. It found that a condi-
tional stay of the proceedings may be the appropriate remedy “where a fair trial 
cannot be held at the time that the stay is imposed, but where the unfairness to 
the accused is of such nature that a fair trial might become possible at a later 
stage”. 98 
 94)  Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR- 2000-55A-A, Appeal Judgement, 29 August 2008, para. 
148. Th e Trial Chamber had based its ﬁ ndings on the evidence of just two witnesses who were 
inconsistent in their testimony about Muvunyi’s speech. Without having properly discussed the 
inconsistencies in their testimony, the Trial Chamber found that the testimony of the two witnesses 
was “strikingly similar”. Moreover, the Trial Chamber had rejected the evidence of one exculpatory 
witness without having discussed the credibility and reliability of that witness. 
 95)  Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR- 2000-55A-A, Appeal Judgement, 29 August 2008, para. 
170. 
 96)  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the consequences of non-
disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to 
stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status conference 
on 10 June 2008, 13 June 2008 (“ICC Trial Chamber decision on stay of proceedings”); Prosecutor 
v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/06-04/06, Decision on the release of Th omas Lubanga Dyilo, 
2 July 2008, para. 34. 
 97)  ICC Trial Chamber decision on stay of proceedings, paras 72, 75, 76, 91, 92. See also below 6.3. 
Disclosure of potentially exculpatory material obtained by the Prosecution through conﬁ dentiality 
agreements. 
 98)  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the consequences of non-
disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to 
stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference 
246 M.E. Badar and N. Karsten / International Criminal Law Review 9 (2009) 227–251
 Regarding the second issue, the Appeals Chamber, by majority, reversed the 
2 July 2008 decision on the release of  Lubanga Dyilo and decided to send the  mat-
ter back to the Trial Chamber for a new decision on the question of his release. It 
held that in case of a conditional stay of the proceedings, the release of the accused 
is not the only “inevitable” consequence and the only “correct course” to take. 
Th e decision whether to release the accused must be taken in accordance with the 
articles and rules governing the detention of the accused prior to conviction. 99 
 On 18 November 2008 Trial Chamber I decided not to grant the release or 
provisional release of Lubanga Dyilo. Th e accused will remain under the custody 
of the Court until the beginning of the trial which has been provisionally sched-
uled to start 26 January 2009. Trial Chamber I also decided to lift the stay of 
proceedings; it held that the reasons for imposing a halt “have fallen away”. 100 
 5.3. Disclosure of Potentially Exculpatory Material Obtained by the Prosecution 
Th rough Conﬁ dentiality Agreements 
 In the  Lubanga Dyilo case, the Prosecution made extensive use of a provision 
allowing the Prosecution not to disclose material obtained through  conﬁ dentiality 
agreements with information-providers. 101 Th e Trial Chamber held that instead 
of resorting to that provision exceptionally and for the sole purpose of generating 
new evidence, the Prosecution had used the provision “routinely, in inappropriate 
circumstances”. 102 
 Th e ICC Appeals Chamber in the  Lubanga Dyilo case acknowledged a poten-
tial tension between the conﬁ dentiality to which the Prosecutor agreed in conﬁ -
dentiality agreements with information-providers and the requirements of a fair 
trial. 103 In the Appeals Chamber’s view, in order to resolve the tension, the Trial 
Chamber has to be provided with the material in question in order to assess 
whether the material must be disclosed to the accused, had it not be obtained on 
the condition of conﬁ dentiality. However, the Trial Chamber shall respect the 
conﬁ dentiality agreement and shall not order the disclosure of the material 
on 10 June 2008”, 21 October 2008 (“ICC Appeals Chamber decision on stay of proceedings”), 
paras. 4, 76. 
 99)  Articles 60, and 58(1) of the ICC Statute, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled 
“Decision on the release of Th omas Lubanga Dyilo, 21 October 2008, paras 1, 31-42. Judge Pikis 
dissenting. 
 100)  A written decision will follow in due course. 
 101)  Pursuant to Rule 54(3)(e) of the ICC Statute the Prosecutor may agree not to disclose, at any 
stage of the proceedings, documents or information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of 
conﬁ dentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the 
information consents. 
 102)  ICC Trial Chamber decision on stay of proceedings, para. 72. 
 103)  ICC Appeals Chamber decision on stay of proceedings, para. 43. 
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 without prior consent of the information-provider. If the information-provider 
does not consent to the disclosure, the Trial Chamber will then have to determine 
which counter-balancing measures can be taken to ensure that the rights of the 
accused are protected and that the trial is fair. 104 
 5.4. Contact Between Counsel and Accused Appearing as a Witness in Th eir Own 
Defence 
 In the  Prlić et al. case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that an accused who 
appears in his own defence must not be deprived of the assistance of his counsel 
during his testimony. It is a fundamental right of an accused to have access to 
counsel “at any stage of the proceedings”. 105 
 Th is ruling overturns case-law of the Tribunal limiting the contact between the 
counsel and the accused while the latter is taking the stand in his own defence. 
Th is case-law was not only based on the general prohibition of contact between 
witnesses and the parties during the course of their testimony, but also on the 
concern that coaching of the accused by his counsel may render the accused’s 
testimony unreliable. 106 
 According to the Appeals Chamber, the general prohibition of contact between 
a witness and the parties during the testimony does not  per se bar communication 
between an accused testifying in his own defence and his counsel. Further, it held 
that the reliability of the accused’s testimony may be tested during cross-exami-
nation when the Prosecution can seek to establish that the accused was improp-
erly coached by his counsel on how to respond to questions. 107 Th e Appeals 
Chamber also pointed to the general presumption that conversations between the 
accused and his counsel are “appropriate”. 108 
 Presumably, it is not easy to establish that communications between an accused 
and his counsel were not “appropriate”. Th e ambiguity of the term “appropriate” 
led Judge Shahabuddeen and Judge Vaz to attach a joint declaration indicating 
 104)  ICC Appeals Chamber decision on stay of proceedings, paras 3, 43-48. 
 105)  Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR73.10, Decision on Prosecution’s appeal against 
Trial Chamber’s order on contact between the accused and counsel during an accused’s testimony 
pursuant to Rule 85(C), 5 September 2008, paras 14, 19. 
 106)  Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Oral decision, 16 October 2000, T. 5956; Prosecutor 
v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Finalized procedure on Chamber witnesses; Decisions and 
Orders on several evidentiary and procedural matters, 24 April 2006, para. 31. Th e Appeals 
Chamber found that there was no precedent binding the Trial Chamber in the Prlić et al. case. 
 107)  Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR73.10, Decision on Prosecution’s appeal against 
Trial Chamber’s order on contact between the accused and counsel during an accused’s testimony 
pursuant to Rule 85(C), 5 September 2008, paras 17, 18. 
 108)  Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR73.10, Decision on Prosecution’s appeal against 
Trial Chamber’s order on contact between the accused and counsel during an accused’s testimony 
pursuant to Rule 85(C), 5 September 2008, para. 18. 
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that the term “appropriate” must not be understood to mean that counsel could 
advice the accused on how to respond to questions. 
 5.5. Impeachment of One’s Own Witness – Discretion of the Trial Chamber 
 Is a party to proceedings before international criminal tribunals allowed to 
“impeach” its own witness? Must it seek permission to do so? Th e ICTY Appeals 
Chamber in the  Popović et al. held that, while impeachment of one’s own witness 
is permitted in general, it is for the Trial Chamber to determine whether to allow 
the calling party to cross-examine its own witness and to limit, where  appropriate, 
the scope of the questioning. 109 It thereby reversed the decision of the Trial 
Chamber that it is for each party, albeit at their own peril, to determine to what 
extent the credibility of a witness is to be challenged. 110 In the Appeals Chamber’s 
view, leaving the impeachment in the hands of the calling party would preclude 
the other party to object to the impeachment or to the scope of the cross- 
examination. 111 Whether the witness must be declared “hostile” prior to cross- 
examination is, in the Appeals Chamber’s view, also a matter to be determined by 
the Trial Chamber. 112 Th e Appeals Chamber in the  Popović et al. case further 
held that evidence adduced through the cross-examination of a party’s own wit-
ness may not only be received as evidence for assessing the credibility of the 
 witness, but may also be considered in relation to substantive issues. 113 It is within 
the Trial Chamber’s discretion to decide for what purposes the evidence is 
admitted. 114 
 5.6. Witnesses Called During Appellate Proceedings – Karadžić Testiﬁ es in the 
Krajišnik Case 
 Th e ICTY Appeals Chamber in the  Krajišnik case allowed  Krajišnik to call 
 Karadžić as a witness during the appellate proceedings. Th e Trial Chamber had 
 109)  Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-AR73.3, Decision on appeals against decision on 
impeachment of a party’s own witness, 1 February 2008, paras 26, 28. 
 110)  Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Decision on certiﬁ cation and clariﬁ cation of the Trial Chamber’s oral 
decision on impeachment of a party’s own witness, 21 November 2007, paras 14-16; Transcript of 
Hearing, 17 September 2007, T. 15457-15458: Th e majority of Trial Judges held that “the old-
fashioned or maybe archaic rules prohibiting or restricting the impeachment of one’s own witness, 
applicable in some common law jurisdictions,” have no application in the Tribunal, where profes-
sional Judges decide on matters of fact and law”. 
 111)  Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-AR73.3, Decision on appeals against decision on 
impeachment of a party’s own witness, 1 February 2008, paras 26, 28. 
 112)  Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-AR73.3, Decision on appeals against decision on 
impeachment of a party’s own witness, 1 February 2008, para. 28. 
 113)  Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-AR73.3, Decision on appeals against decision on 
impeachment of a party’s own witness, 1 February 2008, para. 29. 
 114)  Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-AR73.3, Decision on appeals against decision on 
impeachment of a party’s own witness, 1 February 2008, para. 32. 
 M.E. Badar and N. Karsten / International Criminal Law Review 9 (2009) 227–251 249
 115)  Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Decision on appellant Momčilo Krajišnik’s 
motion to call Radovan Karadžić pursuant to Rule 115, 16 October 2008, paras 14, 16-20. See also 
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Order on “motion to interview Radovan Karadžić with a view to then calling 
him as a witness pursuant to Rule 115”, 20 August 2008. 
 116)  Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Scheduling order, 21 October 2008. 
 117)  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the appeals of the 
Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on victims’ participation of 18 
January 2008, 11 July 2008, paras 1, 30-32, 38. 
 118)  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the appeals of the 
Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on victims’ participation of 18 
January 2008, 11 July 2008, para. 32. 
 119)  Rule 85(A) reads: For the purposes of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence: (a) 
‘Victims’ means natural persons who have suﬀ ered harm as a result of the commission of any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.” 
convicted  Krajišnik of crimes against humanity, including the murder, persecu-
tion and extermination carried out by the Bosnian Serb regime against Bosniaks 
and Bosnian Croats during 1992, but acquitted him of genocide charges. 
 Th e Appeals Chamber considered that the requirements for hearing additional 
evidence tendered on appeal were satisﬁ ed, namely that  Karadžić’s evidence had 
been “unavailable” at trial. Further, his evidence was  prima facie credible, relevant 
and probative and that it also could have a potential impact on the verdict. 115 
 Karadžić’s evidence in the  Krajišnik case was closely related to the facts that he 
himself is charged with. Th us, his testimony had a tendency to be incriminating. 
Th e Appeals Chamber therefore directed the Registry to inquire whether  Karadžić 
wished to exercise his right to be assisted by counsel and to assign counsel in that 
case. 116 During his testimony  Karadžić was represented by counsel who objected 
to several questions put to  Karadžić on the grounds that the accused could 
incriminate himself by answering. 
 5.7. Victim Participation 
 On 11 July 2008 the ICC Appeals Chamber rendered a signiﬁ cant decision in 
relation to victim participation. It held that the harm suﬀ ered by victims does not 
necessarily have to be direct and may also be indirect, provided that it is personal. 
Material, physical and psychological harm are all forms of harm that fall within 
the rule, if they are suﬀ ered personally by the victim. 117 Th us, for example, the 
recruitment of a child soldier may result in personal suﬀ ering of both the child 
and the parents of the child. 118 
 Th e Appeals Chamber further held that only victims who are victims of the 
crimes charged may participate in the trial proceedings and reversed the decision 
of the Trial Chamber in that regard. Unlike Rule 85(A) of the ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, the provision deﬁ ning who is a victim, 119 Article 68(3) 
of the ICC Statute restricts participation of victims in that it requires that per-
sonal interests of the victims are aﬀ ected. Th us, on the basis of the “Rome Statute 
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 120)  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the appeals of the 
Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on victims’ participation of 18 
January 2008, 11 July 2008, paras 2, 58-65. 
 121)  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the appeals of the 
Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on victims’ participa)tion of 18 
January 2008, 11 July 2008, paras 3, . 
 122)  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the appeals of the 
Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on victims’ participation of 18 
January 2008, 11 July 2008, paras. 3, 86-104. 
 123)  Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the appeals of the 
Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on victims’ participation of 18 
January 2008, 11 July 2008, para. 97. 
 124)  Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Pikis, para. 3. 
 125)  Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Pikis, paras 4-13, 15, 19. 
framework”, the harm alleged by a victim and the concept of personal interests in 
Article 68(3) of the ICC Statute must be linked with the charged conﬁ rmed 
against the accused. 120 
 Th irdly, the Appeals Chamber held that victims may lead evidence pertaining 
to the guilt or innocence of the accused when requested and that they may also 
challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence in the trial proceedings, but 
only upon a showing that personal interests would be negatively aﬀ ected. 121 
Although it is primarily the parties who lead evidence pertaining to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused, the Appeals Chamber found that this does not preclude 
the possibility for victims to lead evidence. Victims have to make a discrete appli-
cation, give notice to the parties, comply with disclosure obligations and protec-
tion orders, show appropriateness and consistency with the rights of the accused, 
and, last not least, demonstrate their personal interests. 122 In the Appeals 
Chamber’s view, in order to “give eﬀ ect to the spirit and intention of Article 
68(3)” it must be interpreted as to make participation “meaningful”. 123 
 In his partly dissenting opinion, Judge Pikis disagreed with the majority that 
the harm suﬀ ered could also be indirect and stated that he would require a “direct 
nexus” between the crime and the harm. 124 Judge Pikis also disagreed that victims 
may lead evidence pertaining to the guilt of innocence of the accused and to chal-
lenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence. In his view, victims are not made 
parties to the proceedings and their participation is conﬁ ned to expressing their 
views and concerns. 125 
 6. Sentencing 
 6.1. No reduction of Sentence Due to “Good Political Motivations” 
 In the case against  Fofana & Kondewa , the SCSL Appeals Chamber increased 
 Fofana’s sentence from six to 15 years and  Kondewa’s sentence from eight to 20 
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 126)  Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeal Judgement, 28 March 2008, 
para. 513 et seq. 
 127)  Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeal Judgement, 28 March 2008, 
paras 528, 529. 
 128)  Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeal Judgement, 28 March 2008, 
para. 531. 
 129)  Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo, Case No. ICTR-2001-63-T, 24 September 2008, para. 391. 
years. In October 2008, the Trial Chamber of the SCSL had sentenced  Fofana to 
a total of six years and  Kondewa to a total of eight years. As former leaders of the 
government-supported Civil Defence Forces during Sierra Leone’s armed conﬂ ict 
both men in August 2007 were convicted of war crimes. When imposing the 
sentences, the Trial Chamber considered that the accused should receive a reduced 
sentence because they fought for a “legitimate cause”, namely to “restore the dem-
ocratically elected Government”. 
 Th e Appeals Chamber overturned the Trial Chamber’s ruling, considering that 
the political motivations of the Accused in committing international law viola-
tions cannot be considered as a mitigating factor. 126 While the motive of the 
accused, as a general principle, may be considered as a mitigating factor, the par-
ticular motive of “just cause” may not. 127 
 Th e decision constitutes an important correction of a patently wrong consid-
eration by the Trial Chamber. As the Appeals Chamber held, international 
humanitarian law speciﬁ cally removes a party’s political motive and the “justness” 
of a party’s cause from consideration; in fact, accepting “just causes” would 
“undermine the bedrock principle of that law”. 128 
 6.2. Aggravating Circumstance – Accused Was in a Prominent Public Position of 
Trust 
 Nchamihigo was deputy prosecutor of Cyangugu prefecture in Rwanda. Th e Trial 
Chamber found Nchamihigo criminally responsible for genocide, extermination, 
murder and other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity and sentenced him 
to life imprisonment. Th e Trial Chamber noted, in particular, that the accused 
was in a prominent public position of trust, and was expected to uphold the rule 
of law, yet he exhibited zeal in the perpetration of these grave crimes. Th us, he 
promoted an “environment of impunity”. 129 


